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Agency costs as a result of the separation of ownership and control within a 
firm can be a hurdle to the performance and profitability. It has been 
suggested that these costs can be reduced by the presence of a single large 
shareholder monitoring management and their decisions. On the contrary it 
has also been argued that a large shareholder negatively affects firm 
performance by deriving personal benefits from the firm and making sub-
optimal decisions. This research aims to investigate the relationship between 
the profitability of a firm and the level to which the shares of that firm are 
concentrated into a single shareholder. A random effects GLS panel 
regression is used to determine the effect of a large shareholder being 
present in Spanish and Portuguese firms by studying firms listed on these 
bourses over the period 2005 – 2014. The results show that a large 
shareholder has a negative influence in the Portuguese market, and no 



















Entrusting the everyday business of the firm to the managers, shareholders of 
any company place a great deal of trust in those agents to make decisions 
that are value maximizing. This separation of ownership and control has been 
termed the “Principle-Agent Problem”, and can cause agency costs which 
may damage the long term future of the firm and arise when these managers 
make decisions in their own interests and not for the good of the firm as a 
whole (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
These agency costs, which will be defined more clearly later in the paper, take 
various forms but have the common characteristic of decreasing the 
profitability of the firm and causing unnecessary costs. Therefore, the most 
obvious place that these costs can be seen is in the return on equity capital. 
There are various mechanisms, both internal and external, suggested in 
literature to control agents and mitigate these costs. The one in focus in this 
research is the presence of a large controlling shareholder. The core 
proposition is that the presence of a shareholder with a stake in the firm large 
enough to take action against the managers in the event of sub-optimal 
management will lead to the managers making better decisions in line with the 
interests of shareholders. They have both the incentive and the ability to 
monitor managers, and this should translate into lower agency costs for the 
firm as a whole. 
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The base paper for this research, Gedajlovic & Shapiro’s 1998 paper, studied 
this effect in multiple markets and analyzed the interplay that this had with the 
local forms of corporate governance. It is their framework that will be applied 
to the Spanish and Portuguese universe of companies, in order to investigate 
if such a relationship exists within these markets. 
 
This research has also been conducted in other markets (Elyasiani & Jingyi, 
2010; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Kang & Sorensen, 1999), as well as the 
effect of this ownership dynamic on share performance (Edwards & 
Weichenrieder, 2004). It is the objective of this research to determine if there 
is a relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability for 
publically listed firms within Spain and Portugal. The null hypothesis in this 
case is that there is no relationship between the percentage of the firm’s 
shares held by the largest shareholder and the return on common equity 
(profitability). The alternative hypothesis is therefore that there exists a 
positive relationship between the percentage of the firm’s shares held by the 
largest shareholder and the profitability of that firm. 
 
The purpose of this research is to add to the body of corporate finance 
research relating to the principle-agent problem and explores the dynamic of 
this problem within the Iberian context. It will be useful to determine if the 
relationships that have been clearly identified in an international context apply 
here, and if so, some possible reasons for this. These conclusions have their 
most relevant and contributory application in the asset management and 
investment analysis universe. For investors analyzing a potential investment, 
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it is vital to consider the corporate structures and dynamics within the 
management and ownership of a firm, in order to pick a long term winner. 
Having an understanding of the relationship that may exist between 
shareholders and management, and how the size of the largest shareholder 
affects this, will add an additional dimension to their decision-making process. 
If ownership concentration positively affects profitability, a firm with a single 
large shareholder that is able to monitor and discipline firm management will 
be more attractive than a firm that is widely held by a diverse shareholder 
base that relies on internal corporate governance to represent their interests. 
If this relationship is found to exist, management would be incentivized to 
build relationships with their existing large shareholders in order to reinforce 
the positive perception of close monitoring by these parties in the eyes of the 
market – hopefully having a positive effect on the value of their shares and 
their potential growth prospects. This research will also aid future corporate 
finance research into the Iberian environment, identifying potential 
relationships that could be investigated to a more thorough extent, both within 
the corporate governance space as well as from an investor perception 
perspective. 
 
In order to define the scope of this research, some delimitations were decided 
in the early stages. Firstly, the focus was placed on firms within the listed 
Iberian investment universe (Spain & Portugal). The reason for this was the 
high concentrations of family owned and large shareholder companies in this 
market, making it a prime candidate for this type of research (Arosa, Iturralde, 
& Maseda, 2010; Miralles-Marcelo, Miralles-Quirós, & Lisboa, 2014). Also, it 
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has not been included in many studies of this type (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
1998). 
 
The scope of the research was also stringently limited by the type of data that 
was available from the sources used, with only companies with complete 
financial data and sufficient disclosures of ownership splits included. 
Unfortunately this meant that many firms were excluded. Certain variables 
that would have added dimensions to the research, such as identity of the 
blockholder and the change in ownership levels of individual blockholders, 
were not available, once again limiting the scope. Certain measures used in 
the base paper, such as diversification, were also not able to be collected in 
this case. The data collected however, is sufficient to give a window into this 
ownership/profitability dynamic and add to the body of research in a 
meaningful way. 
2 Literature Review 
 
The foundation of the question at hand is the concept of agency costs. 
Defined and described in the seminal article by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
these are costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control of a 
firm between the shareholders and the management. These consequences 




Free cash may be held within the firm by managers to decrease reliance on 
external capital markets, leading to the development of a less than optimal 
capital structure and lower dividends for shareholders (Jensen M., 1986). 
Managers themselves may become entrenched in their positions in spite of 
poor performance, due to the lack of oversight from an empowered 
shareholder (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This can extend to subordinates as 
well, who are often kept in their positions for their value as friends or 
colleages of management rather than their performance in their roles, creating 
an organisation rife with inefficiencies and affecting the long term profitability 
of the firm (Tosi, Bebchuck, L., & Fried, J., 2005). Managers may also wish to 
make the firm larger and expand into additional industries. This behaviour is 
termed ‘empire building’, where the goal of the manager is to be at the head 
of a larger organisation and these expansions are not due to the belief that 
the individual merits of the investments will improve the long term health of 
the firm as a whole (Williamson, 1964). Executive compensation plays a role 
here too, with direct agency costs arising from excessive compensation. 
Managers that have minimal oversight are more able to negotiate more 
generous packages for themselves (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Blanchard, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1994). It is evident from the above that an 
organisation that is plagued by management incurring agency costs will be 
less profitable than a competitor that has management that are making value-
maximising decisions under effective oversight. 
 
Literature has described methods by which these agency costs can be 
mitigated, including executive compensation, which can be used as an 
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incentive to align the interests of the management and the owners (Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999). Another key method, and the 
focus of this research, is the ownership structure of the firm and its influence 
on corporate governance (Jensen M. C., 2000). The identity of the 
shareholders as well as the amount of ownership that lies in the hands of 
managers are elements of ownership structure that can have an effect on 
profitability, but the one in focus here is the presence of a large shareholder. 
Often occuring in family-owned firms, a single large blockholder is the most 
common way in which shareholding is concentrated, rather than in the hands 
of a group of large shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishney, 2000). 
 
A single large shareholder present in the ownership structure of a firm can be 
viewed as a double-edged sword, depending on the actions and incentives of 
that shareholder. On the one hand it can increase the level of monitoring that 
management is subject to and prevent decisions and activities that are value 
destroying from occuring, as is the hypothesis in this research. The other 
perspective is that having a single large shareholder will allow that 
shareholder to extract personal benefits from the firm and make decisions that 
are not in the interests of the minority shareholders and the firm as a whole 
(Andres, 2008; Edwards & Weichenrieder, 2004). 
 
Looking at the negative perspective first, the core of the problem with the 
presence of a majority shareholder is that the very powers that they are 
endowed with to monitor managers and influence the operations of the firm 
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can be abused for their own benefit, such as by diversion of assets or income, 
or decisions to do business with parties in which they have and interest (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Chen, Firth, & Xu, 2009). One example is found within the 
Canadian market, and studied in depth by Rojas (2014). Here the model of a 
single large blockholder and many minority shareholders is commonplace, 
and the minorities in this case can be viewed as the ‘principles’ and the 
blockholder as the ‘agents’, due to the power that they can exert over the firm. 
Rojas found that this setup encouraged majority shareholders to make 
decisions in their own interest rather than those of the firm as a whole, with 
examples such as sub-optimal investment selection, transfers of economic 
rents and inefficiencies in the management  and transfer of firm control. 
Similar processes have been found to be at work in Sweden (Bergstrom & 
Rydqvist, 1990) and the US (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Large 
shareholders have also been found to be unwilling to discipline management 
in some cases, leading to an entrenched management team (Arosa, Iturralde, 
& Maseda, 2010). 
 
The positive influences of a major shareholder have also been well 
documented. From the basic premise that the major shareholder has a 
stronger incentive to monitor management (Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 
2010), to their presence being a solution to the free rider problem of small 
shareholders not having the incentives to monitor management (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986), positive impacts on firm value and performance have been 
observed in multiple markets under a variety of conditions (Aisjah, Juhandi, 
Rofiaty, & Sudarma, 2013; Belkhir, 2009; Edwards & Weichenrieder, 2004; 
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Elyasiani & Jingyi, 2010; Holderness, 2003; Kang & Sorensen, 1999; Kumar, 
2003; Kvist, Pedersen, & Thomsen, 2006; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
 
Numerous studies have also found that there is no clear relationship between 
firm performance and the presence of a large majority shareholder (Andres, 
2008; Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010; Chirinko, Garretsen, Sterken, & van 
Ees, 2004; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Mehran, 1995). Geographic 
complications have also yielded very different results, with positive 
relationships being found in Germany, negative in the UK and no significant 
relationships found in the US and Japan (Gonenc, Seifert, & Wright, 2005).  
 
Within the Iberian space, the majority of research has focused on the 
dynamics within family-owned firms. Family owners are found to be beneficial, 
particularly early on in the life cycle of the firm (Miralles-Marcelo, Miralles-
Quirós, & Lisboa, 2014). Here the benefits are primarily behavioural, with the 
family presence adding an element of multigenerational thinking to the 
decisions of the managers, leading to better long term performance (Patel & 
Chrisman, 2013). The presence of a single large blockholder at the listed firm 
level has not been investigated in depth in this market. 
 
A key element of this question is the role played by the different methods of 
control on the management of a firm. Core to the research of Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro (1998), was the question of internal versus external monitoring. 
Internal monitoring is in the form of pressure exerted from stakeholders within 
the firm, such as the board of directors. External monitoring is driven by 
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pressures that primarily stem from the market for corporate control. Their 
hypothesis was that in the presence of strong internal control mechansisms 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability would 
not hold, due to the fact that the other internal controls were correctly 
functioning and disciplined managers, and this was the case for France and 
Germany in their analysis (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998).  
 
In the context of our question, for ownership concentration to have a marked 
effect on firm performance, Spain and Portugal would need to have internal 
control mechanisms that are either not strong enough or not functioning 
correctly. These two markets would fit within the European framework 
discussed by Gedajlovic & Shapiro where internal controls are strong, 
however evidence has been found that here internal corporate governance 
measures are very often usurped by the power of shareholders, and the 
owner of a company plays a far more active role (Leech & Manjon, 2002). 
Therefore, this research is a test not only of the effect of a large shareholder, 
but also of the corporate governance measures that are intended to be 
disciplining management 
 
As can be seen by the diversity of results and the mulitfaceted nature of the 
question, this is still a very complex issue in corporate governance research. 
This research will aim to investigate this question within the Iberian market, 
and determine what relationships exist in this market and what conclusions 
can be drawn from the investigation. 
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3 Data and Sample Collection  
 
In order to complete this empirical study, a dataset containing financial 
performance and ownership data for all firms publically listed on the 
Portuguese and Spanish bourses was collected from Bureau Van Dijk’s 
Amadeus database. Firms with missing data were excluded from the sample. 
The incompleteness of the data provided by this database is a cause for 
concern, with many firms missing financial data or not disclosing the complete 
distribution of their shares. The final data sets contained 16 Portuguese firms 
and 60 Spanish firms. The time period used was 2005 to 2014, with annual 
data points for all of the variables. This time period was chosen because it is 
the longest period available from the database, and the effects of having a 
large shareholder should only become evident in the profitability of the firm in 
the long run. This relatively large panel dataset should ensure that sufficient 
data points exist to draw meaningful conclusions to test the hypotheses in 
question. All statistical tests were performed using STATA 13. 
 
A panel data regression was chosen for this empirical study, because it allows 
the researcher to control for variables that cannot be measured or controlled, 
as well as variables that change over time but not across entities. That is, it 
allows the researcher to account for individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008), 
which should allow it to isolate the effect that a large shareholder has on the 
dependent variable; this was the procedure used in the base article 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). 
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Prior to the final regression procedure, a number of tests need to be 
performed to ascertain the correct regression procedure to apply to the 
panels. Firstly, variables are checked for any correlations that may have 
become an issue in the regression procedure. 
 
Growth was highly correlated with the return on common equity in both 
samples. This could possibly cause an issue in the regression, however 
considering the importance of this control variable to the regression it 
remained in the final regression. The remaining variables do not seem to be 
correlated with the dependent variable in a meaningful way. See appendix for 
correlation tables. 
 
4 Empirical Model 
 
As mentioned above, the method of statistical analysis being used in this 
study is a panel data linear regression. This method is perfect for the analysis 
of the hypothesis in question because it allows the researcher to isolate 
relationships that apply across and within the entire dataset while accounting 
for individual heterogeneity of the entities. This is achieved by controlling for 
variations between entitles over time in multiple dimensions. Here, it is useful 
to isolate the effect of a single large shareholder while controlling for the 
myriad of other factors that may affect the profitability of a firm. 
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The general starting point for the regression in this case is as follows 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998): 
 
! = ! + ! !"#$% + ! !  
 
Where π represents the level of profitability, TOPSH the level of ownership 
performance and X a vector of control variables. The proposed regression 
equation is as follows: 
!!" = ! + !!!" !"#$% + !!!" !"#$ + !!!" !"#$ + !!!" !"#$ + !!! !"#$ + !!" 
 
Where: 
!!" = Profitability of ! firm at time !  
!"#$% = Level of ownership concentration 
!"#$ = Size of the firm 
!"#$ = Growth rate of the firm 
DEBT = Gearing ratio of the firm 
TEMP = Temporal dummy variable 
!!" = Error term 
! = Intercept value 
 
These variables are defined and mesured as follows: 
 
Profitability (π) 
The dependent variable in question here, profitability is measured in this case 
as the return on common equity (ROCE), which is calculated as the ratio of 
net income to shareholders equity. It is essentially a measure that quantifies 
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how well the equity of the shareholders is being put to use  and how 
effectively the company is being stewarded – this should allow us to answer 
the core question of the influence of a major shareholder on management and 
their actions. 
 
Ownership Concentration (TOPSH) 
This variable is measured as the percentage of the firm that is owned by the 
largest shareholder for each year. Used by Gedajlovic & Shapiro (1998) in the 
same way, the percentage held by this shareholder is assumed to be static 
over the period at the intial value due to the fact that dynamic ownership data 
was unavailable. 
 
Firm Size (SIZE) 
In order to control for the effect that the size of a firm may have on profitability, 
this variable is included. This relationship is rooted in potential economies of 
scale and scope that such size provides, and has been found both in early 
industrial literature and more recently (Hall & Weiss, 1967) (Markides, 1995). 
This variable is measured as the logarithm of total firm assets. 
 
Grow (GROW) 
Product cycle effects and demand dynamics have a large influence on 
profitability, with firms in the growth phase of a new product or facing high 
demand pressures having above-average ROCE. This relationship has been 
observed in previous research and was included in the base paper, and is 
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measured in this case as the year-to-year growth of turnover (Hall & Weiss, 
1967) (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). 
 
Gearing (DEBT) 
The capital structure affects the firm both from a managerial decision-making 
perspective as well as operationally, hence it is vital to control for this. This 
variable is measured as the percentage of debt to assets of the firm. 
 
Temporal Effects (TEMP) 
Time can be considered an exogenous factor, with the business cycle and 
general economic conditions affecting firm operations. This is controlled for by 
including a dummy variable with a different value for each of the 10 years that 
the study spans (Rumelt, 1991). 
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4 Results and Interpretation 
		
 
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 Variables	 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 z	 P>z	   
		 Portugal	 TOPSH	 -0.846922	 0.0429869	 -1.97	 0.049	 		
		 		 SIZE	 2.946695	 1.418014	 2.08	 0.038	 		
		 		 GROW	 1.056342	 0.0693729	 15.23	 0.000	 		
		 		 GEAR	 0.0021064	 0.006771	 0.31	 0.756	 		
		 		 TEMP	 -0.351136	 0.1293715	 -2.71	 0.007	 		
		 		 Constant	 -15.63565	 11.25106	 -1.39	 0.165	 		
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		
		 		 		 Wald	Chi2(5)	 268.81	 		 		 		
		 		 		 Prob	>	Chi2	 0.0000	 		 		 		
		 		 		 R-Squared	 0.7629	 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	




		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		
		 Modified	Wald	Test	 chi2(8)	=	5334.61	 		 		
		 		 		 		 Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000	 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 Variables	 Coefficients	 Standard	Error	 z	 P>z	 		
		 Spain	 TOPSH	 -0.0124335	 0.0324982	 -0.38	 0.702	 		
		 		 SIZE	 0.6539334	 1.04405	 0.63	 0.531	 		
		 		 GROW	 1.800984	 0.1378531	 13.06	 0.000	 		
		 		 GEAR	 0.005076	 0.0068014	 0.75	 0.455	 		
		 		 TEMP	 -0.2743595	 0.2491779	 -1.10	 0.271	 		
		 		 Constant	 -2.549968	 9.541302	 -0.27	 0.789	 		
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 Wald	Chi2(5)	 291.81	 		 		 		
		 		 		 Prob	>	Chi2	 0.0000	 		 		 		
		 		 		 R-Squared	 0.8292	 		 		 		
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		




		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		
		 Modified	Wald	Test	 chi2(8)	=	5300	 		 		
		 		 		 		 Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000	 		 		
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
 
A number of tests need to be done to determine the correct regression 
procedure to be applied to the data. Firstly, a Hausman test needs to be 
performed on both datasets to determine if fixed or random effects regression 
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methods should be applied. If the p-value of the test statistic is higher than the 
level of significance (5% in this case), then the null hypothesis of the test is 
rejected and the fixed effects model should be applied. In both cases the null 
hypothesis of the test was not rejected, implying that the random effects 
method should be applied (p-values of 0.7995 and 0.1571 respectively). 
  
Heteroskedasticity is also an issue to consider, as unaccounted for 
differences in the variance of the variables can lead to inaccurate conclusions 
being drawn from the data in question. In order to test for heteroskedasticity 
the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity was applied. The null 
hypothesis of the test is that there is no heteroskedasticity present in the data. 
For both the Spain and Portugal datasets the null hypothesis was rejected, 
and heteroskedasticity was deemed to be present. Based on the conclusions 
of these tests, the regression procedure utilized for both datasets was a 
random effects GLS panel regression with robust standard errors to correct 
for heteroskedasticity. 
 
The regression testing aims to isolate the effects of a single large shareholder 
on the firm and the returns that it generates. Hence, the key metric in this 
case is the significance of the test statistic relating to the level of ownership 
concentration (TOPSH). In the case of Portugal, this variable in the regression 
is significant at the 5% significance level and the coefficient of the variable is -
0.012, indicating that there is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between the level of ownership and concentration and firm profitability. For 
Spain, the TOPSH variable was not significant at the 5%, 10% or 15% levels. 
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Within the Portugal regression, the variable for size was significant at the 5% 
level with a positive coefficient, indicating that there was a positive 
relationship between the size of a firm and the return on equity. This implies 
that there are economies of scale and scope at work within this market. 
Growth also shows a significant positive relationship, with firms growing at a 
faster rate having a better return on equity. The temporal dummy is also 
significant, indicating that the business cycle and overarching economic 
conditions prevailing in each year had a significant effect on the performance 
of the firm. 
 
The regression for Spain indicated that the environment was different to that 
one prevailing in Portugal. The only significant variable at the 5% level was 
growth, indicating that there are major advantages for shareholders of being 
involved in a growing firm, but things like size and temporal factors were not 
impactful. 
5 Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 
The interplay between shareholders and management is one that has been 
the focus of researchers in many different fields of finance and corporate 
governance. It is key to understand how these actors interact and make 
decisions within the legislative and corporate framework in which they find 
themselves. This work focused on the presence of a shareholder with a large 
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stake in the firm, and the effects that this had on the return on equity and 
hence the profitability of the firm. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis put forward in this paper – that the presence of 
a single large shareholder would discipline management and hence improve 
profitability – a random effects GLS panel regression was run on data from 
companies listed on the Spanish and Portuguese bourses. The results 
showed that the presence of a single major shareholder was detrimental for 
the return on common equity for firms in Portugal. This result contradicted the 
initial expectations from theory and previous research, where the positive 
benefits of a large shareholder were expected to improve profitability, or the 
strength of European internal corporate governance measures should have 
meant that there was no significant relationship. This indicates that within the 
Portuguese market, large blockholders are extracting personal benefits and 
not disciplining management in the correct ways to benefit the firm as a 
whole, its stakeholders and the minority shareholders. 
 
In the case of Spain, no significant relationship was found between ownership 
concentration and firm profitability. This is in line with the theory put forward 
by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) that the internal governance measures 
were sufficient to discipline management and prevent the presence of a large 
shareholder being either significantly positive or negative. 
 
Going forward, these results could be useful to investors in each of these 
markets, with caution being exercised in Portuguese markets when investing 
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in a firm with a single large shareholder. The tendency for these shareholders 
to extract personal benefits and have an overall detrimental effect on firm 
performance could mean that the investment is sub-optimal in the long run. 
There are also supplementary conclusions that reinforce previous findings in 
literature and may assist investors in their analysis, such as the positive 
influence of the growth rate of a firm in both markets and both growth and size 
in the Portuguese market. 
6 Limitations 
 
An undeniable obstacle to the clarity and scope of this research has been 
data availability. The dataset that was accessed missed key variables that 
would have improved the regression and added extra depth to the analysis. 
The proportion of the firm’s assets that are foreign along with the number of 
industries in which it operates were key variables to determine the level of 
diversification of the firm, one of the variables used by Gedajlovic & Shapiro 
(1998). Industry codes for each of the firms would have also been useful so 
as to eliminate the effect that the different industry that a firm operates has on 
its profitability. The fact that numerous data entries had to be removed from 
the dataset is also a major issue, as the lack of ownership information may be 
systematic, with companies with certain structures of ownership choosing to 




Although a topic of other potential research in and of itself, the identity of the 
individual blockholder could have been a useful area to consider. The effect 
could be different if the blockholder is the founding family versus if it is a 
private equity fund that has recently acquired the shares. The other holdings 
of the major shareholder are also key. For example, evidence has been found 
that when a controlling stakeholder in a corporation is very highly diversified in 
their own right, that entity is more likely to be risk-taking (Faccio, Marchica, & 
Mura, 2011). 
 
There may also be a question mark remaining around the effect of a group of 
large shareholders, acting either cooperatively or at odds with one another, on 
the firm. Therefore a more detailed shareholding breakdown would be useful 
and would allow for more analysis as to this potential dynamic and its effects 
on management. 
 
Life cycle may also be a very valuable consideration to include. This research 
and much like it focuses on listed companies, and the fact that they are listed 
means that they are fairly far along in their life cycle. The dynamic of 
shareholder involvement and effect would be very different for a firm that is 
very early on in its life cycle, as the incentives of the owners would be to grow 
and mature the firm to greater profitability. This is different to the later stages, 
in which the firm could be seen as a ‘cash cow’ for the owners, who seek to 




Future research could also be qualitative, with the managers and 
shareholders of these concentrated firms being interviewed for their 
perspectives on the pressures and relationships that exist and how they 
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